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Decentralized spatial computing in urban environments
Abstract
This chapter presents the concept of decentralized spatial computing (DeSC) as a way to embed
dynamic spatial data capture and processing capabilities within our built urban environment. The
chapter illustrates the potential of DeSC for safe- guarding privacy in a dynamic location-based services
scenario: Mobile service users protect their potentially sensitive location by the use of a decentralized
query algorithms, solely collaborating with peers close by and thereby excluding the privacy bottleneck
of an omniscient global service provider. In an extensive set of consecutive experiments several
decentralized query algorithms were tested, trading the level of privacy for the quality of service. The
use of a real world test bed, — a small part of Ordnance Survey's OS MasterMap® Integrated Transport
Network™ Layer for Southampton — underlines the experiments' validity. The chapter concludes with
a research and development agenda for DeSC in the urban context.
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This chapter presents the concept of decentralized spatial computing (DeSC) as a 
way to embed dynamic spatial data capture and processing capabilities within our 
built urban environment. The chapter illustrates the potential of DeSC for safe-
guarding privacy in a dynamic location-based services scenario: Mobile service 
users protect their potentially sensitive location by the use of a decentralized query 
algorithms, solely collaborating with peers close by and thereby excluding the pri-
vacy bottleneck of an omniscient global service provider. In an extensive set of 
consecutive experiments several decentralized query algorithms were tested, trad-
ing the level of privacy for the quality of service. The use of a real world test bed, 
— a small part of Ordnance Survey’s OS MasterMap® Integrated Transport Net-
work™ Layer for Southampton — underlines the experiments’ validity. The chap-
ter concludes with a research and development agenda for DeSC in the urban con-
text. 
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1 Introduction 
In a world of dynamic, networked, and data-rich computing, the days of spatial 
data processing in a monolithic geographic information system are numbered. 
Ubiquitous, embedded, and highly distributed computing has led to the emergence 
of pervasive computing, ubiquitous computing, ambient intelligence (AmI), and 
‘everyware’ (Greenfield, 2006). Similarly, spatial computing systems are becom-
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ing highly dynamic, multi-party networks, in which mobile human users interact 
in dynamic networks, and spatially distributed autonomous computing nodes form 
the ‘cyber-infrastructure’ of urban environments. These spatial applications of 
‘everywhere’, termed here ambient spatial intelligence (AmSI), are becoming in-
creasingly important to the natural and built environments of the future. 
The goal of AmSI is to embed spatial data capture and processing capabilities 
within the environment itself, for example using wireless sensor networks (WSN). 
Traditional forms of centralized, client/server spatial data processing are hardly 
capable of enabling AmSI. Amongst other issues, centralized approaches to the 
highly dynamic, real-time nature of AmSI data sources lead to information and 
communication overload, unmasking the unscalable nature of conventional GIS 
and spatial database architectures. Omniscient centralized databases furthermore 
present a potential privacy breach. Hence, AmSI rather requires adopting decen-
tralized architectures, where spatially distributed but collaborating computing 
nodes autonomously take on responsibility for responding to spatial queries with 
no centralized control (Laube & Duckham, in press). For example, with respect to 
privacy protection, such decentralized architectures allow private and sensitive 
spatial data to be collected at different sites, and analyzed in a decentralized way 
without collating and storing personal data in a centralized GIS or spatial data-
base. 
The emergence of such decentralized spatial computing (DeSC) is so far most 
evident in the area of environmental monitoring, where wireless geosensor net-
works are challenging conventional ways of centralized modeling and detecting 
change (Duckham, Nittel, & Worboys, 2005; Worboys & Duckham, 2006) The 
same paradigm shift is now also reaching the urban context, where spatial infor-
mation processing provides the backbone of a range of application domains, in-
cluding location-based services (LBS), traffic management, and facilities man-
agement. Hence, this chapter explores the notion of  DeSC for embedding AmSI 
in urban environments. 
AmSI has also raised clear privacy concerns, due to its potential for real time 
monitoring and rapid integration of personal and sensitive location information 
(Dobson & Fisher, 2003). The same technological advancement that allows AmSI 
to pervade our urban environments also leads to the availability of finer and finer 
granularities of location information about users of LBS. With ever finer spatio-
temporal granularity, however, location information becomes a quasi-identifier, 
allowing re-identification of previously anonymized information (Bettini, Wang, 
& Jajodia, 2005). Hence, when considering the future of AmSI, balancing the 
quality of provided services and the level of privacy sacrificed for those services, 
becomes a key challenge. 
In this chapter, we examine the potential for using DeSC techniques to deliver 
high quality, dynamic location-based services within an AmSI environment, at the 
same time as protecting the privacy of mobile individuals accessing those services. 
Our approach is explicitly dynamic: instead of protecting individual location fixes, 
we aim to protect ‘trajectory privacy’ ? the degree to which aggregated knowl-
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edge of an individual’s location over time can be used to invade that person’s lo-
cation privacy. In our decentralized approach, mobile individuals query their spa-
tial neighbors for responses to spatial queries. Since the neighborhood of a mobile 
individual is constantly changing, the likelihood that a single hostile agent ever 
collects enough information to seriously threaten any particular individual’s loca-
tion privacy is decreased. In other words, mobile individuals ‘smear’ their location 
information across spacetime in order to protect their privacy. For many common 
spatial and LBS queries (for example, k-nearest neighbors) this strategy can still 
enable relatively high quality of service because it can exploit the spatial structure 
of decentralized knowledge, where mobile agents that are closer in space are more 
likely to possess information relevant to one another.  
In conclusion, the major contributions of this chapter are: 
— a discussion of the potential of DeSC in an urban context; 
— a case study applying and testing the concept of DeSC for safeguard-
ing privacy in a LBS application; and 
— a road map for further DeSC research and development in the urban 
context. 
2 Related Work  
Recent work in at least three distinct areas is particularly relevant to our work. 
This section provides an overview and synthesis of these three related topics: cur-
rent paradigm shifts in process-oriented spatiotemporal modeling of urban envi-
ronments; the fundamentals of decentralized spatial computing; and location pri-
vacy protection for LBS. 
2.1 The city in flux 
Urban environments are highly dynamic. On various spatial and temporal scales, 
urban events and processes range from urban sprawl through migration over 
commuter traffic flows to pedestrian movement in a mall. Or as Worboys and 
Hornsby (2004, p. 327) state figuratively, ‘processes of urban growth and decline, 
migration, and expansion, constitute the city in flux’. LBS and intelligent travel 
assistance are just two examples that illustrate the potential of AmSI and DeSC in 
urban environments (Dillenburg, Wolfson, & Nelson, 2002). For example, Winter 
and Nittel (2006) have shown for shared ride trip planning that decentralization is 
not only scalable but can deliver near-optimal solutions with local knowledge 
only. 
4  
Any ontological treatment of urban environments must account for both their 
statics and dynamics (Galton, 2001, 2003; Grenon & Smith, 2004; Worboys, 
2001). The ontology is divided into four components 
— continuant entities, often called objects: entities that exist in their com-
pleteness at any moment in time, have no temporal parts, but have quali-
ties that might change through time. Examples include roads, vehicles, 
people, mobile agents, houses, and cities. 
— occurrent entities, often called events: entities that happen, are situated in 
spacetime and have temporal parts. Examples include journeys, the con-
struction of a house, or dynamic points of interest, such as traffic acci-
dents. 
— processual entities: entities having some of the characteristics of occur-
rents, but not anchored in spacetime. Examples include walking (oppose 
this to a specific walk event). Flows in networks, such as vehicle densi-
ties along a transportation link, are often placed in this category (Galton 
& Worboys, 2005). 
— situational entities: sometimes called sites. These are the spatiotemporal 
references of entities in the above categories, if they have them. A house 
is situated in a region of spacetime, a journey might be thought of as a 
trajectory in spacetime. Depending upon the entity, the temporal compo-
nent can be more or less important. 
When it comes to ontological analysis or conceptual modeling for urban DeSC, 
not only must the above categories be investigated in the specific scenario pre-
sented, but also relationships between them. For example, in an LBS system, a 
mobile service user (continuant entity) may participate in a commuter journey 
(occurrent entity) through urban space, which is situated along a specific route in a 
transportation network (situational entity). It is this detailed and rigorous analysis 
that can provide the foundation of the computational model of the system. 
In the context of DeSC for urban environments, such ontological analysis is 
paramount as it offers a foundation for querying dynamic systems (Worboys, 
2005) and for abstracting movement patterns (Stewart Hornsby & Cole, 2007). 
Galton and Worboys (2005) identified specifically the application domain of traf-
fic (specifically Ordnance Survey’s OS MasterMap® Integrated Transport Net-
work™ layer, ITN) for their conceptual model for dynamic spatial networks. 
2.2 Decentralized Spatial Computing 
Advances in ad-hoc wireless networking and micro-fabrication have enabled a 
new way of capturing and processing spatiotemporal information. Wireless sensor 
networks (WSN) ? networks of untethered, wireless, battery powered miniatur-
ized computers ? monitor their environment by sensing, processing, and commu-
nicating information in a collaborative way (Zhao & Guibas, 2004). Recent re-
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search activity in the area of WSN has focused on the establishment and mainte-
nance of the network (e.g. Braginsky & Estrin, 2002; Cheng & Heinzelman, 
2005), including many ingenious techniques using the spatial characteristics of the 
network for that purpose (e.g. Karp & Kung, 2000; Mauve, Widmer, & Harten-
stein, 2001; Yu, Govindan, & Estrin, 2001). WSN are especially well suited to 
monitor dynamics in geospace (geosensor networks (Nittel, Stefanidis et al., 
2004)) and vehicular traffic (vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANET) (Kosch, Adler, 
Eichler, Schroth, & Strassberger, 2006)). 
In this chapter we use the term decentralized system to specifically refer to a 
distributed system, where no component of the distributed system ‘knows’ the en-
tire system state (Lynch, 1996). In decentralized systems, individual elements 
must cooperate to complete some processing task, but both the task and the data 
remain distributed throughout the network. Hence, decentralized spatial comput-
ing aims at the development of algorithms that can operate using purely local 
knowledge, but are still able to monitor geographic phenomena with global ex-
tents (Estrin, Govindan, & Heidemann, 2000; Laube & Duckham, in press). 
For several reasons decentralized (in-network) algorithms are increasingly im-
portant to AmSI. First, decentralization increases network scalability and robust-
ness, which is paramount to dynamic urban applications involving potentially 
thousands or millions of phone users or vehicles. Second, unlike global ap-
proaches, decentralized algorithms facilitate fast local updating in dynamic net-
works, as they do not require hard-to-maintain global consistency. Third, in-
network data pre-processing reduces the need for network-wide communication, 
and hence conserves critically limited energy and bandwidth resources in the 
WSN. In this chapter we explore the potential of DeSC for providing location 
based services in a VANET scenario, where energy constraints are negligible as 
vehicles have engines and hence almost unlimited energy resources. Scalability, 
robustness, and a constantly changing network topology, however, remain critical 
VANET issues to be addressed through DeSC. 
2.3 Safeguarding Privacy 
In pre-internet and pre-database times privacy was safeguarded through the frag-
mented nature of personal information sources (Rule, McAdam, Stearn, & Uglow, 
1980). One’s bank knew about personal finances, the police about one’s crime re-
cord, and the grocer about shopping habits; data integration was impractical, in-
ference nearly impossible. The current inexorable integration of previously dis-
joined data sources into centralized databases creates omniscient bottlenecks open 
to fraud.  
Recent improvements in mobile computing and location-aware technologies al-
low for the capture and communication of fine-grained spatiotemporal information 
about mobile individuals. Trajectories contain information in the form of sensitive 
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personal points of interest and movement patterns (Bettini et al., 2005). Hence, 
trajectory information may act as quasi identifier, allowing the reidentification of 
anonymized data, just as with a non-spatial social security number. The increas-
ingly dense cyber-infrastructure of our built urban environments increases privacy 
concerns for unsuspecting users of AmSI. 
Conventional approaches protecting the privacy of mobile individuals involve 
regulation, privacy policy, and various forms of data hiding (see Verykios, 
Damiani, and Gkoulalas-Divanis (2008) for a comprehensive overview). Regula-
tory approaches to privacy develop rules to govern fair use of personal informa-
tion, most importantly legislation (Langheinrich, 2001). Privacy policies rely on 
trust and stipulate allowed uses of location information (Kaasinen, 2003). Most 
recently, considerable effort has been put into various strategies of hiding sensitive 
information, especially sensitive spatial information. Anonymity concerns the dis-
sociation of information about an individual, such as location, from that individ-
ual’s actual identity. k-anonymity ? one of the most important anonymity ap-
proaches ? protects an individual’s privacy in that each sensitive release is 
hidden in at least k equally matching individuals (Bettini et al., 2005). Kido, Ya-
nagisawa, and Satoh (2005) hide true users’ trajectories by mixing them with syn-
thetic ‘fake’ ones, so-called ‘dummies.’ Finally, obfuscation involves the deliber-
ate degradation of the quality of location information (Duckham & Kulik, 2005). 
3 Protecting Privacy with DeSC 
One of the weaknesses in the previous approaches to location privacy protection 
reviewed above is that they typically adopt a static model of privacy, aiming pri-
marily to protect an individual’s privacy for a specific instant, query, or site. 
Given the importance of dynamic information in urban environments (‘the city in 
flux’), this research adopts an explicitly spatiotemporal approach to privacy pro-
tection. We argue that the disclosure of the odd (static) locational fix is often ac-
ceptable, especially as this information rapidly becomes out-of-date. Instead, gath-
ering of trajectory information over time is the most imperative threat to an 
individual’s geospatial privacy, enabling hostile agents to infer spatiotemporal pat-
terns, and analyze or predict behaviors. Thus the focus of this work is less to pro-
tect the individual’s location at a specific point in time, but rather to protect the 
trajectory in its entirety as a spatiotemporal entity.  
The approach to protecting trajectory information explored in this chapter 
achieves spatiotemporal privacy protection by using DeSC. As we have seen, 
ubiquitous and location-aware computing environments bring with them privacy 
threats as they can potential be used to collect automatically more and more de-
tailed spatiotemporal information about an individual’s location. However, we ar-
gue that DeSC allows the inversion of that process. Where centralized spatial 
computing architectures make the collation of spatiotemporal data easier, in de-
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centralized architectures sensitive knowledge is ‘smeared’ across spacetime. Po-
tentially, decentralization ensures no single system component can accumulate de-
tailed knowledge about any individual, and so privacy is protected. 
3.1 An LBS scenario 
Consider the following scenario for safeguarding privacy in an urban LBS appli-
cation using decentralization. Multiple mobile individuals are moving through an 
urban street network, each carrying a mobile location-aware device (like a PDA or 
wireless sensor node). From this point on we simply refer to the combination of a 
mobile individual and his or her mobile location-aware device as a mobile agent. 
In a DeSC environment, nearby mobile agents are assumed to be able to commu-
nicate with each other using short-range communication (e.g., WiFi or Bluetooth). 
Points of interest (POIs) are also distributed throughout the urban network. These 
POIs may be static, such as retail stores or coffee shops, or dynamic, like wireless 
hotspots, meetings, or traffic jams. Whenever an agent encounters a point of inter-
est (POI), the agent’s device stores that POI’s ID and location. In many cases, the 
process of identifying POIs may be completely automatic (e.g., a device might 
automatically identify a wireless hotspot POI via WiFi radio frequency signals, or 
retail store via RFID). However, in some cases semi-automatic or manual genera-
tion of this information is conceivable (e.g., user tagging of points of interest).  
Given this scenario, one important task is to be able to answer k-nearest 
neighbor queries, like ‘Where is my nearest POI?’ Answering such questions is a 
basic function of conventional centralized LBSs. However, in this work we look at 
the extent to which DeSC can be used to provide the same function, at the same 
time as protecting a user’s location privacy. An important simplifying assumption 
in the following discussion and subsequent experiments is that POIs are ‘semi-
dynamic’ in the sense that POI locations are initially unknown and must be dis-
covered by mobile agents, but POIs change with relatively low frequency when 
compared with the movement of agents. In other words, in the context of our sce-
nario, once a POI has been discovered by an agent it remains valid for a relatively 
long period of time (when compared with the frequency with which agents move 
into and out of the system). Such a scenario is suitable for many (but not all) dy-
namic phenomena (e.g., ad hoc WiFi hotspots, which while dynamic can be usu-
ally relied upon to still be active hours or even days after first observed by an 
agent). 
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Fig. 1. LBS scenario: mobile agents in an urban road network store information about POIs they 
have encountered, and can pose nearest neighbor queries to neighboring agents within (n-hop) 
communication range. 
Figure 1 shows a simplified example of the basic scenario for five mobile 
agents a - e. Mobile agents store information about POIs they have directly en-
countered (e.g., agent b stores location and identity information about POIs 4 and 
3). When an agent requires information about the nearest POI it can query its own 
stored data as well as query any neighbors within range (e.g., agent b can also 
query agent c for its closest POI). For clarity, the scenario in Figure 1 shows a dis-
connected agent network, where only 1-hop communication at most is possible. 
However, in more connected networks, the nearest neighbor query may involve 
multiple hops, potentially querying the entire network of agents, maximum hops 
and network connectivity allowing. 
Thus, over time in our scenario agents moving around the urban environment 
will discover more and more of the environment, enabling the system as a whole 
to answer nearest-neighbor queries more and more accurately; but at the same 
time agents will reveal information about where they are located when they pose a 
query, potentially reducing their location privacy. 
3.2 Experimental methodology 
The performance of a decentralized, location-based nearest-POI service was ex-
plored empirically using a series of simulations. The goal of these simulations was 
to investigate the extent to which such decentralized LBS can provide useful ser-
vices at the same time as effective spatiotemporal privacy protection. The simula-
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tion was programmed using a combination of Java and Oracle spatial DBMS, 
linked using JDBC (Java data-base connectivity) APIs. The experiments used a 
small part of Ordnance Survey’s ITN data set for downtown Southampton, on the 
southern coast of the UK. Moving toward data models and databases that are ca-
pable of supporting AmSI is an important research problem for national mapping 
agencies like Ordnance Survey, especially within the context of next-generation 
intelligent transportation systems (ITS). 
Each experiment was initialized with 100 randomly positioned POIs. A total of 
100 agents was also randomly positioned in the network, initially with no knowl-
edge of the location of the POIs. At each time step, agents move to adjacent nodes 
in the network. Any POIs encountered by (i.e., co-located with) an agent results in 
that POI’s ID and location being stored in that agent’s local memory. In this sim-
plified simulation, no agents or POIs are ever destroyed or leave the simulation, 
and no agents or POIs are created after initialization of the simulation.  
Over time, the mobile agents explore more of the network, discovering more 
POIs. Figure 2 shows a typical example of the state of the system after 50 time 
steps, with darker shaded circles indicating agents with knowledge of the location 
of more POIs. Agents can choose to engage in peer-to-peer communication with 
other nearby agents. The simulation allows a range of communication radii to be 
used, and single or multi-hop communication. In this way, agents can choose to 
share information about POIs they have encountered, or query nearby agents about 
the nearest POIs.  
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Fig. 2. Example snapshot after t = 50 time steps of the state of a simulation, with mobile agents 
(MA, dots) moving around the road network of central Southampton, UK. Darker shading of 
agents indicates an agent has knowledge of the location of more POIs (stars). Data is OS Mas-
terMap® Integrated Transport Network™ Layer Ordnance Survey © Crown Copyright. All 
rights reserved. 
The following sections describe four increasingly sophisticated experiments 
that begin to uncover the behavior of a decentralized system for safeguarding tra-
jectory privacy across a range of experimental parameters. 
4 Experiment #1: Quality of service vs. level of privacy 
The first experiments evaluated the levels of privacy and quality of service attain-
able by mobile agents using a decentralized nearest POI query. Initial simulations 
explored the situation where a query agent queried all other agents within its 
communication neighborhood at each time step for the query agent’s nearest POI. 
The query agent and its neighboring agents used their own knowledge of POIs, if 
any, to compute the answer to the nearest neighbor query and return the POI loca-
tion and network distance to the query agent. The best answer (in terms of shortest 
distance to POI) was then selected from all the responses. It was assumed that all 
agents possessed complete knowledge of the static road network (but, note, not the 
semi-dynamic POI locations). Although this is a somewhat simplifying assump-
tion, it is not unrealistic as today many mobile devices currently store large 
amounts of (static) transportation network data. 
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In this dynamic scenario it is not possible to guarantee exact answers to que-
ries. For example, from Figure 1, agent b may be closest to POI 6. Because none 
of the agents within communication range of b at the time of query have encoun-
tered POI 6, agent b may receive a sub-optimal nearest neighbor query response of 
POI 7. Given that the POIs are assumed to be (semi-)dynamic, it would similarly 
not be possible to guarantee exact answers to queries using a centralized approach 
(for example, where discovered POIs are reported back to a central server; in such 
a case POI 8 would still remain undiscovered). However, unlike a centralized ap-
proach, using decentralized queries enables a balance between quality of service 
and level of privacy to be struck. If agents choose to reveal their location informa-
tion to more neighbors (e.g., using multi-hop communication or larger communi-
cation distances), then the likelihood of receiving an optimal nearest neighbor re-
sponse increases, but leads to lower levels of privacy. Conversely, if an agent 
decides to reveal its location information to fewer neighbors, then the levels of 
privacy for that agent is expected to increase but at the cost of lower quality of 
service (i.e., fewer optimal query responses). Striking an acceptable balance be-
tween level of privacy and quality of service is one of the key goals of a good pri-
vacy protection system.  
Figure 3 shows a typical example of how levels of privacy and quality of ser-
vice (averaged across 100 simulations) vary for agents over 100 simulation time 
steps, referred to as a QoS/LoP signature. In Figure 3, the quality of service is 
measured in terms of the inaccuracy in query responses. Two different measures 
of inaccuracy are used: the fraction of agents who do not receive the optimal query 
response, and the percentage of agents who do not receive any response at all. As 
would be expected, at the beginning of the simulations, levels of inaccuracy are 
extremely high, since the agents have not yet explored much of the environment, 
and so know relatively little about the POIs. However, as the simulation proceeds, 
quality of service rapidly improves, indicated by rapidly dropping levels of inac-
curacy. At the end of the simulation, approximately 90% of agents are receiving 
the optimal query response (i.e., the closest POI).  
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Fig. 3. Typical QoS/LoP ‘signature’, showing increasing average and worse case levels of pri-
vacy over simulation time, and increasing quality of service, in terms of decreasing inaccuracy in 
query responses. 
The level of privacy of agents is also quantified with two different measures. 
The average level of privacy indicates what percentage of an agent’s trajectory on 
average is unknown to any other arbitrarily chosen single agent. Figure 4 illus-
trates the general idea behind using knowledge of trajectories as a basis for meas-
uring the level of privacy. In the figure, assuming agent b communicates its loca-
tion to agent c during the entire duration they are in direct 1-hop communication 
range, about 70% of agent bs trajectory is unknown to c (a level of privacy for b of 
0.7 with respect to c). The average level of privacy is initially very low, since after 
only a few time steps knowledge of only one or two locations for a query agent is 
likely to constitute a high percentage of that agent’s entire trajectory, and so low 
levels of privacy. However, as simulation time allows the system to equilibrate, 
the level of privacy increases asymptotically. At the end of 100 time steps, an arbi-
trarily chosen node will, on average, only know less that 20% of a query agent’s 
trajectory (indicated by an average level of privacy of more than 80%).  
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Fig. 4. Level of privacy is measured as percentage of an agent’s trajectory that is not known to 
other agents. Agent b does not know about ~60% of cs trajectory (c has privacy level of 0.6 with 
respect to b; by contrast, c does not know about ~70% of bs trajectory (b has privacy level of 0.7 
with respect to c). 
While average level of privacy does provide a good picture of the degree to 
which trajectory information about a mobile agent is ‘smeared’ across the net-
work, it can be argued that it is a poor overall measure of location privacy, since 
only one node is needed to potentially result in a breach in privacy. To better re-
flect the potential privacy risk of one agent invading another’s privacy, the second 
measure of level of privacy is the worst case privacy which indicates what per-
centage of a query agent’s trajectory on average is unknown to the agent that 
knows most about that query agent. Although the worst case level of privacy is 
necessarily lower than the average case, the pattern is still the same, showing 
steadily increasing levels of privacy. 
 
Discussion. Figure 3 shows that it is possible to achieve a balance of quality of 
service and level of privacy using decentralized spatial computing techniques. The 
levels of privacy provide a reflection of how information about an agent’s location 
is ‘smeared’ across spacetime. While 100% accuracy in quality of service cannot 
be guaranteed, relatively high qualities of service can be achieved (and even for a 
centralized LBS, quality of service would never be perfect either, since typically 
some POIs may by chance remain undiscovered by any agent). 
Most importantly, when explicitly protecting trajectory privacy and not loca-
tion privacy, the suggested decentralized peer-to-peer query procedure allows in-
dividual agents the spatiotemporal accumulation of knowledge for a better QoS 
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without compromising their privacy. In other words, when protecting trajectory 
privacy, levels of privacy and quality of service both can improve over time. This 
contrasts to most approaches protecting location privacy, where the collation of 
knowledge over time in centralized architectures leads to worsening privacy. 
5 Experiment #2: Communication network effects 
The results presented in section 4 are typical of simulation results across a range 
of simulation parameters. Two such important parameters are related to the com-
munication network used for locally querying nearby agents in a decentralized 
way. The communication range of agents and number of ‘hops’ used to propagate 
queries through the network will affect both the balance of quality of service and 
level of privacy. Larger communication radii and more hops will tend to lead to 
improved quality of service (since it extends the communication neighborhood of 
a node, resulting in more nodes contributing their knowledge of the environment 
to the query response) as well as decreased levels of privacy (since more nodes 
will be informed of the location of a query agent). 
The QoS/LoP signature in Figure 3 showed the results for a simulation using a 
communication radius of about 1/16 of the diameter of the study area (1/16 being 
~200m), and using 1-hop communication for queries. In other words, in Figure 3 
only agents that are at most 200m from a query agent will respond to a query. Fig-
ure 5 summarizes the effects of changing communication radius on quality of ser-
vice. A range of communication radii were tested, measured as a proportion of the 
size of the overall study area (so for example, a communication radius of 1/2 
translates into approximately 1600m, half the diameter of the study area; 200m 
translates into a communication radius of approximately 1/16). 
As expected, quality of service increases (i.e., service inaccuracy decreases) 
asymptotically across all communication radii over simulation time, with larger 
communication radii generally leading to higher service qualities. It is noticeable 
that increasing the communication radius to above about 1/4 of the study area di-
ameter leads to no further perceptible improvements in quality of service. In other 
words, at communication radii above 1/4 of the study area size, no additional in-
formation relevant to nearest POIs queries is being found.  
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Fig. 5. Effects of communication radius on quality of service. Communication radius is meas-
ured as a proportion of the size total study area, i.e., communication radius of 1 means agents can 
communicate directly with all other agents in the study area, radius of 0 means agents do not 
communicate. 
Discussion. The effects of increasing the number of hops for queries is similar to 
increasing the communication range (since on average doubling the communica-
tion range means approximately as many nodes will be queried as by doubling the 
hop limit). Consequently, it is not surprising that similar results to those in Figure 
5 were obtained from similar studies of increasing hops in queries. The key mes-
sage of Figure 5 is that most of the information relevant to a nearest POI query can 
be expected to reside in close spatial proximity to the query agent. Thus increasing 
hops or communication radius leads to diminishing returns in terms of increased 
quality of service. Conversely, level of privacy rapidly decreases for increasing 
communication radius and hops, such that for any communication radius of above 
1/4 of the study area diameter or hop count above 3, there almost always exists at 
least one agent that has near-complete knowledge of a query agent’s trajectory 
(i.e., the query agent has zero privacy). Thus, in decentralized LBS, the communi-
cation network is critical to maintaining an acceptable balance of level of privacy 
and quality of service. Communication needs to be restricted enough to prevent 
privacy being compromised, at the same time as enabled enough to ensure reason-
able quality of service. 
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Finally, it is also noticeable that in Figure 5 a communication radius of 0 (i.e., 
no communication, agents can only query their own database of POIs they have 
already seen) still leads to relatively high qualities of service, of around 60% op-
timal answers. This can be ascribed to the random walk movement behavior of the 
agents, which means they tend to stay and thoroughly explore relatively small, 
spatially constrained regions of the environment. The following experiment ad-
dresses this shortcoming.  
6 Experiment #3: Goal directed movement 
As discussed in the previous section, the movement regime of agents can affect 
the observed quality of service and level of privacy. Random walk, used in the 
previous experiments, is not a realistic movement regime for most mobile humans 
accessing location-based services. To address this issue, the experiments were re-
peated using goal-directed movement, where agents move from their current loca-
tion to a randomly selected destination using the shortest path. When an agent 
reaches its destination in our simulation, it is immediately re-tasked with a new 
randomly selected destination, to which it again moves along the shortest path. 
The effect of changing the movement behavior to goal-directed is expected to both 
increase level of privacy (since a query agent is expected to meet and reveal its lo-
cation to a wider range of other agents less frequently) and decrease quality of 
service (since in general agents in a locality are less likely to have thoroughly ex-
plored and identified all the POIs in that area). 
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Fig. 6. QoS/LoP signature for same scenario as Figure 3, except where agents perform goal-
directed movement rather than random walk. 
Figure 6 shows the signature from the same simulation scenario as Figure 3 
(communication radius 1/16 of the study area diameter, and 1-hop communica-
tion), except where agents are using goal-directed movement instead of random 
walks. As expected, the levels of privacy are indeed increased, rising to 0.7 in the 
worst case (i.e., at the end of the simulation, there exists no agent that knows more 
than 30% of the trajectory of a query agent), and the quality of service is de-
creased somewhat when compared with agents performing random walks. It is in-
teresting to note, however, that contrary to expectations the quality of service in 
terms of query agents who receive some answer (albeit not necessarily the optimal 
answer) actually increases. This is presumably because goal-directed movement 
results in greater mixing of agents, also ensuring good mixing of knowledge. Con-
versely, random walk tends to allow clustering of agents, and occasionally of ig-
norant agents who happen to have no knowledge of nearby POIs.  
 
Discussion. Since goal-directed movement tends to increase mixing and aid 
spacetime ‘smearing’ of an agent’s location information, agents engaged in such 
movement regimes can afford to reveal more about their location while still main-
taining the same overall level of privacy. Experiments with a range of network 
communication parameters revealed that using 1-hop communication with a 
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communication radius of 1/8 of the study area yielded some very favorable results, 
with worst case levels of privacy of 0.5; average case privacy of 0.15; more than 
80% of agents receiving an optimal answer; all agents receiving some answer; and 
more than 90% of agents receiving a nearest POI that was less than 50% further 
away than the optimal answer (i.e., relatively good suboptimal-answers). While 
the highly simplified simulation setup means that these values do not have any 
real meaning outside the simulation, this result does provide encouragement that 
by varying the decentralized query parameters it is possible to achieve high levels 
of privacy in concert with high qualities of service.  
7 Experiment #4: Push and pull queries 
In all the simulations discussed thus far, agents query using a ‘pull’ strategy, 
where information is only ever exchanged between agents when a query is gener-
ated. However, it is also possible to design decentralized privacy protection sys-
tems that utilize ‘push’ strategies, where information is opportunistically pushed 
to communication neighbors in case required at a later stage. 
In contrast to the discreet pull strategy in Figure 1, push is a more loquacious. 
Using the push strategy, mobile agents synchronize their knowledge of POIs with 
any nearby agents they ‘meet’ (i.e., agents that move into each other’s n-hop 
neighborhood). Figure 7 illustrates the push strategy for the same mobile agents, 
POIs, and trajectories as Figure 1. The key difference between the figures is that 
agents in Figure 7 ‘push’ information about POIs whether or not an explicit query 
has been received. As a result, mobile agents can accumulate information about 
remote POIs they have not directly encountered (e.g., agent c ‘hears’ about POIs 
3, 4, and 6 from agent b, who in turn hears about POI 6 from agent e). 
In a pure push strategy, agents who later require a response to a nearest 
neighbor query can simply query their own locally stored data about POIs without 
querying nearby nodes. The push strategy is similar to the concept of information 
dissemination in mobile ad-hoc geosensor networks (and specifically the ‘flood-
ing’ strategy) explored in more detail in Nittel, Duckham, & Kulik (2004). 
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Fig. 7. Push strategy: mobile agents in an urban road network store information about POIs they 
have encountered and share this information with other neighboring agents within (n-hop) com-
munication range. Nearest neighbor queries can then be submitted to the agent’s local POI data-
base (cf. Figure 1). 
Figure 8 illustrates the typical effects of adopting a push strategy, like that ex-
plored in Nittel et al. (2004), upon the QoS/LoP signature. Figure 8 uses the same 
basic simulation parameters as Figure 6 (i.e., goal-directed movement, communi-
cation range of ~200m). Using the push strategy, agents exchange at every oppor-
tunity all their knowledge about the locations of POIs with any other agent within 
direct 1-hop communication range. Unlike the pull strategy, when a query agent 
subsequently requires information about the nearest POI, it merely queries it’s 
own stored POI data. 
Figure 8 illustrates that the push strategy performs better in terms of QoS that 
the corresponding pull strategy. This is to be expected, as the push strategy leads 
to much more widespread dissemination of POI information, ensuring that agents 
are much more likely to receive high quality responses to queries. Indeed, Figure 9 
shows how using a push strategy can result in improved QoS almost irrespective 
of communication radius (since using a push strategy, all agents will ‘hear’ about 
newly discovered POIs after a relatively small number of hops).  
 
20  
 
Fig. 8. QoS/LoP signature for same scenario as Figure 6, except where agents use push rather 
than pull strategy. 
However, also as might be expected the push strategy leads to lower levels of 
privacy than the pull strategy, as it requires that agents reveal information about 
their location much more frequently (i.e., whenever they meet another agent). In 
practice, the discrepancy between the levels of privacy achievable with a push and 
pull strategies is likely to be much greater than suggested by Figures 8 and 6. 
Agents using a pull strategy are unlikely to require near-continuous responses to 
queries as in our simulations, needing instead to make occasional pull queries. 
Thus in practice, the levels of privacy achieved by pull queries are expected to be 
much higher than in our simulations. However, because it is not known in advance 
what information will be subsequently required, there are no such obvious privacy 
optimizations that can be adopted using a push strategy. 
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Fig. 9. Effects of communication radius on quality of service for push strategy (cf. Figure 5). 
Discussion. The results clearly indicate that while push strategies can improve 
QoS, equivalent pull strategies are expected to provide better privacy protection. 
While the focus of this work is on privacy protection, an important practical issue 
that is not addressed by these simulations is the communication and computational 
overhead of the different strategies. Push strategies generally lead to much higher 
volumes of data being stored and exchanged, placing strong demands on resources 
such as communication bandwidth, data storage space, and battery power. While 
these issues are not as important in most mobile computing environments as they 
are in, for example, wireless sensor networks, they are still a potential threat to 
system scalability.  
8 Conclusions and Outlook 
This chapter promotes the vision of ambient spatial intelligence (AmSI) for urban 
environments. Decentralized spatial computing (DeSC) is presented as a key com-
putational strategy enabling AmSI. It is argued that decentralization not only 
copes with the highly dynamic computing systems underlying AmSI, but even of-
fers additional benefits not easily accessible with comparable centralized solu-
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tions. The additional benefit from decentralization addressed in this chapter is 
safeguarding privacy of LBS users. For a decentralized LBS the balance of quality 
of service and level of privacy has been investigated with a comprehensive set of 
consecutive experiments covering various network communication parameters 
(one-hop vs. multi-hop communication, variable communication ranges) and mo-
tion regime parameters (random vs. goal directed walk). The experiments revealed 
that for carefully chosen network communication parameters the decentralized ap-
proach indeed allowed protection of privacy whilst maintaining reasonable quality 
of service.  
One identified advantage of a decentralized LBS is its inherent affinity for dy-
namics. The same motivating arguments as presented for ‘semi-dynamic’ POIs, 
certainly hold for even more dynamic scenarios, when POI change with high turn-
over rates. When quick response to a constantly changing topology is prime, then 
the intimate relation of proximity and decentralization becomes most obvious. Ac-
cepting that nearby changes are probably most relevant to other service users 
nearby, what could be more efficient and effective than exchanging locally rele-
vant information only with other agents nearby? The chosen example of safe-
guarding privacy through service decentralization illustrates that accepting the 
challenge of in-network data processing not only presents additional complexity 
but potentially also offers benefits. Not only does local information exchange limit 
the depletion of global network resources, but, as has been shown in the experi-
ments presented in this chapter, it may also safeguard privacy as agents receive the 
service they want with only local disclosure of their potentially sensitive location 
information. Clearly, it is exactly this application layer in the otherwise technol-
ogy driven area of AmSI where GIScience has to make its contribution, as has 
been shown with exploiting the spatiotemporal nature of movement for safeguard-
ing privacy. 
DeSC and geosensor networks have been widely explored for environmental 
monitoring, largely focusing on enabling spatial applications under the harsh tech-
nological constraints of WSN. Well defined monitoring tasks ? such as for ex-
ample tracking an evolving contamination area ? proved to be very useful for in-
augural research on DeSC. Such initial work on DeSC addressed well known 
GIScience challenges, including the complexity of spatial data, uncertainty, and 
interoperability. Additionally, the new technologies allowing DeSC also revealed 
the need for in-network data processing and decentralization which in turn pre-
sents a set of new exciting challenges. First, highly dynamic p2p computing steps 
alongside client-server architectures. Second, decentralization promotes the notion 
of local knowledge as opposed to global knowledge. Consequently, decentraliza-
tion and partial data processing inherently involves incomplete knowledge, requir-
ing in turn the use of heuristics and approximation solutions. In general, these old 
and new challenges to DeSC also apply for urban applications. There are, how-
ever, some more challenges emerging specifically in urban DeSC. 
The number of agents in AmSI is potentially much larger than a few thousand 
nodes deployed in an ecological monitoring network. Just imagine AmSI applica-
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tions involving RFID tags on retail products. Quite in contrast to environmental 
applications, the networks used for urban AmSI will rarely be deployed explicitly 
for a DeSC application and rather make use of existing cyber-infrastructure (e.g. 
buddy tracking in a cell phone network). Hence, the secondary DeSC application 
will have much less influence on system configuration and tasking. Hence, urban 
DeSC applications will rather aim at exploiting given constraints than relying on 
lofty assumptions. Finally, urban WSNs are expected to be highly heterogeneous, 
potentially including nodes as different as radio relays, vehicle board-computers, 
handsets and RFID tags all together. DeSC for urban applications will hence face 
the difficulty of processing even larger and more heterogeneous data than envi-
ronmental geosensor applications. 
 
To conclude, we identify four main research and development topics for DeSC 
in the urban context: 
— With respect to decentralized privacy protection in LBS, a further inves-
tigation of hybrid push-pull approaches, potentially reaching an opti-
mized QoS and LoP. 
— Further exploration of DeSC for safeguarding privacy in mobile commu-
nication applications (e.g., buddy tracking, child watch). 
— Relaxation of the simplifying assumption of homogeneous single-
purpose networks and investigation of DeSC applications for heterogene-
ous networks. 
— The exploration of decentralized spatial data mining techniques for mo-
bile WSN, especially suited for very large and very heterogeneous sys-
tems emerging urban AmSI applications. 
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